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In the paper we analyze how the possibility of revealing information
to a competitor alters the entry/investment behavior of a ﬁrst entrant.
We show that once it has entered the market, the ﬁrm might refrain from
making further proﬁtable investments in order to hide information from
the competitor. Moreover, we show that before entering the market, the
ﬁrst entrant anticipates that there is a strategic advantage in choosing an
initially small scale of entry: in this way it “commits” itself to revealing
the true state of the market with its subsequent decisions and this fact is
beneﬁcial since it induces the competitor to postpone entry into market.
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11 Introduction
Market entry is a decision that typically involves uncertainty and publicly avail-
able information on, for instance, consumers’ tastes, market size, stock of infras-
tructure or costs of doing business is not always a suﬃcient guide. In this case the
availability of other sources of information is particularly important. Kinoshita
and Mody (1997), in an empirical study on Japanese multinationals, show that
other two sources of information have great inﬂuence in determining the deci-
sion of a ﬁrm to invest abroad: direct experience, that is, information gathered
through past investment in the same market and information externalities, that
is, information inferred from the behavior of other investors. In particular, as
far as the latter source is concerned, the authors claim that the investment de-
cision of a rival ﬁrm “... conveys the information that the rival considers the
investment in a particular country to be a proﬁtable venture, thus increasing the
incentives to invest in that country to beneﬁt from the same opportunity”. The
importance of the behavior of competitors in revealing the market conditions is
illustrated also in Bardacke (1996). Commenting the decision of General Motors
to locate its Asian hub in Thailand the author observes that “... the fact that 11
car manufacturers already operate in Thailand was a sign that the country’s in-
famous physical infrastructure and labor bottlenecks could be overcome”.1 The
importance of information externalities when deciding about entry into a market
has been pointed out also in contexts diﬀerent from FDI. In two diﬀerent studies
on the entry and exit behavior in the retailing sector, both Carree and Thurik
(1996) and Nijkamp (2001) conclude that the probability of a ﬁrm entering in-
creases if during the previous year a rival ﬁrm has entered the same market.2
Interestingly, the authors obtain this empirical result even when controlling for
other variables that possibly reveal information about the proﬁtability of the
market such as the incumbent’s proﬁtability and (a measure of) market growth.
1This sort of follow-the-leader behavior has been highlighted in many empirical papers
dealing with FDI. For instance, Huang and Shirai (1994) show that ﬁrms investing in developing
countries often take a wait and see attitude: they delay their investment decisions to observe the
performances of early entrants. Similarly, Wheeler and Mody (1992) and Mody and Srinivasan
(1996) ﬁnd that the existing stock of foreign capital has a major impact on the decision of a
ﬁrm to invest in a country.
2Toivanen and Waterson (2001) obtain a similar result in an empirical study on the UK
counter service burger market.
2As they point out previous entry works as a “demonstration eﬀect”: it signals
the presence of proﬁtable opportunities in the market.
Curiously, the issue of entry in a context in which ﬁrms can learn from the
behavior of rivals has not been addressed in the theoretical literature. On the one
hand, the industrial organization-oriented literature on entry does not consider
the possibility of information externalities. Indeed, in most of the cases the anal-
ysis is performed assuming that there is no uncertainty3 and when uncertainty
is considered, it is assumed that it resolves exogenously for all the ﬁrms as time
goes by.4 On the other hand, the literature that focuses on the role and eﬀects
of the presence of information externalities does not consider that learning can
occur among rival agents.5 It is commonly assumed that the interaction among
players is of a purely informational type; that is, information externalities are
considered but pay-oﬀ externalities are not. In this context, for an agent the
actual decisions of the others matter only because of the information they con-
vey. The main consequence of this assumption is that an agent may strategically
choose a wait and see strategy to induce the other to take a risky investment
decision that reveals the state of the market but no other strategic behavior
arises.6
This paper is a ﬁrst attempt to study the issues of entry and exit of rival
ﬁrms in a context where information externalities might arise. In the model,
we consider two competing ﬁrms that have the opportunity to enter a market
of unknown proﬁtability. The uncertainty about the market conditions can be
resolved in two ways: either through direct experience, that is, by entering the
3See, for instance, Tirole (1988) chapter 8.
4See Brander and Spencer (1992), Maggi (1996), McGahan (1993) and Somma (1999).
5See, among others, Alexander-Cook et al. (1998), Caplin and Leahy (1998), Chamely and
Gale (1994), Gul and Lundholm (1995) and Rob (1991).
6In Rob (1991) and Alexander-Cook (1998) the link between agents is not purely informa-
tional; however, also in these cases no strategic behavior other than strategic waiting arises.
Rob (1991) considers the entry behavior of a competitive industry in an uncertain environ-
ment. In his model ﬁrms do not act strategically and the entry rate is determined by the
zero proﬁt condition. In Alexander-Cook et al. (1998) it is assumed that ﬁrms enjoy pay-oﬀ
complementarities. In this setting there can be strategic waiting but once a ﬁrm decides to
enter the market there is no advantages in behaving strategically in order to fool the others.
On the contrary, it has every advantage in communicating the true information to attract the
other ﬁrms in the market and enjoy the pay-oﬀ complementarities.
3market, or by inferring information from the behavior of a (informed) rival, that
is, through information externalities. The main goal of our analysis is to study
how the entry/investment behavior of a ﬁrst entrant is altered because of the
information it reveals to the competitor. We show that the investment decisions
of this ﬁrm, both after as well as before entering the market, are altered due to the
presence of information externalities. Once it has entered the market, the ﬁrst
entrant might refrain from making additional investment even when the market
is proﬁtable. Indeed, the ﬁrm anticipates that an increase in its investment
level signals a proﬁtable opportunity and thus it induces the competitor’s entry.
We show that the incentives to hide this information are higher the stronger
the eﬀect of competition and the larger the investment the ﬁrst entrant has
already in place. This last observation explains why the presence of information
externalities makes it more beneﬁcial for the ﬁrst entrant to choose an initially
small scale of entry. In this way, the ﬁrm “commits” itself to revealing the true
proﬁtability conditions once it has entered the market. The ﬁrst entrant beneﬁts
from this fact because by “committing” to revealing more precise information it
induces the competitor to play a wait and see strategy, that is, to postpone entry
in order to learn more about the market proﬁtability.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the outline of the
model. In Section 3, we consider a simpliﬁed version of the model that highlights
the main results of this paper. We characterize the equilibrium of the game
as well as the strategic behavior of the ﬁrst entrant. Section 4 discusses some
possible extensions of the model. Finally, Section 5 is devoted to the conclusions.
The proofs of the various results we highlight in the analysis can be found in the
Appendix.
2 The model
We consider two rival ﬁrms that are deciding on whether to enter a market of
uncertain proﬁtability. The market is composed of 3 identical sites and entry in
each site requires an irreversible investment I: The proﬁts that are obtained in a
site depend on the number of ﬁrms that are present and on the prevailing state
of nature. There are three possible states of nature: bad, medium and good.
Before entry, ﬁrms know that the three states are equally likely. Moreover, they
4know that the state of nature whatever it is, is common to all the sites belonging
to the market. Uncertainty can be resolved only in two ways: directly through
entry in at least one of the sites or indirectly by observing the decisions of an
informed ﬁrm.
We consider a three-periods game. Firm A, the ﬁrst entrant, plays at t = 1
and at t = 2, while ﬁrm B plays at t = 2 and at t = 3: Each of them maximizes
the sum of pay-oﬀs it gets in the various periods. We assume that ﬁrms do not
discount future pay-oﬀs; that is, the discount factor is assumed to be equal to
one.
At t = 1, ﬁrm A chooses its initial scale of entry, that is, it chooses to enter
any number mA 2 f0;1;2;3g of sites. Provided that mA ¸ 1, it observes the
true state of nature before t = 2: If mA = 0 is chosen, ﬁrm A obtains no new
information. At t = 2; it can choose any couple of integers (out;in) such that




; that is, it can exit any number out of the sites
it has entered at t = 1 and it can enter any number in of the sites it has not
entered during the previous period. As we shall see, the following choices are









Also at t = 2; ﬁrm B chooses its initial scale of entry, that is, mB 2 f0;1;2;3g.
It takes this decision simultaneously with the t = 2 decision of ﬁrm A and after
having observed mA: At t = 3, it can choose any couple of integers (out;in) such




. These choices have the same meaning as
the ones we have described for ﬁrm A. Firm B observes the true state of nature
between t = 2 and t = 3; provided that it plays mB ¸ 1: If mB = 0 is chosen,
then it can learn the information revealed by A’s choice at t = 2. Clearly, this
latter choice is informative provided that mA ¸ 1: We say that ﬁrm B plays Wait
and See when it chooses mB = 0 after observing that A has played mA ¸ 1:
Throughout the paper we will assume that the proﬁts in each site satisfy
the following assumptions. In the case of a bad state of nature, the per-period
proﬁts in a site are assumed to be strictly negative. In the medium state, the
per-period proﬁts are strictly positive but overall, that is summing up the proﬁts
that a ﬁrm collects in a site during all the periods in which it is active, they
are not suﬃcient to cover the investment expenditure: Finally, when the state
of nature is good, the per-period proﬁts are suﬃcient to cover the investment
expenditure. These assumptions are supposed to hold both for monopoly as well
5as for duopoly proﬁts.
Moreover, we will assume that, in expected terms, entry is proﬁtable even
when duopoly proﬁts are to be earned. That is, proﬁts in the good state of
nature are large enough to compensate the investment expenditures and the
losses incurred in the case of a bad state and even when a ﬁrm is a duopolist.
One consequence of all these assumptions is that the ﬁrst entrant is not able
to deter the entry of the competitor. In other words, it implies that we focus on
a scenario that resembles the accommodated entry case deﬁned in Tirole (1988).
3 A Simpliﬁed Setting
In this section, we present a simpliﬁed setting that highlights the most interest-
ing messages of the paper. In what follows, we normalize to 1 the per-period
monopoly proﬁts that are earned in a site in the case of the good state of nature.
Moreover, we assume that in the case of the bad state of nature the per-period
proﬁts are negative but negligible and, similarly, that in the case of the medium
state of nature they are positive but negligible. As we clarify shortly below, these
latter two assumptions imply that when choosing their initial scale of entry ﬁrms
only consider the proﬁts they earn in the good state. We begin the analysis by
considering a benchmark in which we assume that ﬁrms are not rivals.
3.1 Benchmark: ﬁrms are not rivals
When ﬁrms do not compete with each other (i.e. they are not rivals), the proﬁts
that are obtained in a site only depend on the prevailing state of nature. As
a consequence, when taking its decisions, ﬁrm A disregards the behavior of B.
Consider ﬁrm A choosing any mA ¸ 1 during the ﬁrst period:7 it pays mA(I), it
earns mA(1) in the case of the good state and negligible proﬁts in the case of the
other two states. Therefore, the ﬁrst period expected pay-oﬀ is 1
3mA(1)¡mA(I).
During the second period, ﬁrm A plays knowing the true state of nature and its
optimal behavior can be easily characterized. When it of a good type (that is,
when it has observed that the state of nature is the good one), ﬁrm A knows
that it is optimal to be active in all the three sites. Therefore, it plays Enter
7It can be easily veriﬁed that choosing mA = 0 is a dominated strategy.
6if mA 2 f1;2g was chosen at t = 1 and Stay in case of mA = 3. When it is
of a medium type, it chooses Stay to earn the positive (even though negligible)
proﬁts available in the sites it has already entered. Finally, when it is of a bad
type, it plays Exit to avoid incurring in (negligible) losses. Therefore, when
playing mA ¸ 1 at t = 1, ﬁrm A anticipates that during the second period it will
earn 1
3(3¡(3¡mA)I). In addition to that, at t = 1 ﬁrm A also anticipates that
at t = 3 it will earn 1
3(3), that is, it will earn a proﬁt of 1 in all the three sites
provided that the state of nature is the good one.
A similar reasoning applies to ﬁrm B when it chooses any mB ¸ 1. However,
this ﬁrm has another option too. During the second period ﬁrm A plays knowing
the true state of nature and thus, by choosing mB = 0, ﬁrm B can take advantage
of the information that the behavior of the ﬁrst entrant reveals. As just shown,
after playing mA 2 f1;2g, ﬁrm A’s behavior reveals the prevailing state of nature:
the ﬁrst entrant plays Exit, Stay or Enter depending on whether it is of a bad,
medium or good type. On the contrary, after choosing mA = 3, ﬁrm A plays
Stay both in the case of the medium as well as in the case of the good state.
Therefore, when observing Stay ﬁrm B can infer that either the medium or the
good state has occurred and it assigns probability 1
2 to each of these two states
of nature.
Proposition 1 characterizes the optimal initial scale of entry of the two ﬁrms;
that is, the optimal decision of ﬁrm A and ﬁrm B at t = 1 and t = 2 respectively.8
To compare it with the analysis of the next subsection we restrict our attention
to the set of parameters such that I · 4
5.9
Proposition 1 Assuming that ﬁrms are not rivals, then: when I · 1
2; ﬁrm A
plays mA = 3 at t = 1 and ﬁrm B plays mB = 3 at t = 2; when 1
2 < I · 4
5, ﬁrm
A plays mA = 1 at t = 1 and ﬁrm B plays Wait and See at t = 2:
The benchmark highlights the “basic trade-oﬀ” that ﬁrms face when choos-
ing their initial scale of entry: larger expected proﬁts during the initial period
8Formally, Proposition 1 could be stated for I < 1
2 and for I > 1
2. Indeed, at the boundary
I = 1
2 the negligible proﬁts in the bad and medium states would determine the optimal choice
of the ﬁrms. Without loss of generality, we assume that when I = 1
2 entering the 3 sites is
optimal. A similar reasoning applies to Lemmata 2, 3 and 5 and to Proposition 6.
9This implies that for ﬁrm B the expected pay-oﬀ of playing mB=1 at t = 2 is positive.
7vs lower expected investment expenditures. As we verify in the proof of Propo-




(1) ¡ I +
1
3
I ¸ 0: (1)
By entering an additional site the ﬁrm obtains larger expected proﬁts during
the initial period; that is, it obtains proﬁts in the additional site during the
entry period if the good state of nature has occurred. However, the expected
investment expenditure is also larger: it pays the investment required to enter
the additional site with certainty, while, by entering one site less this expenditure
is incurred during the next period and only in the case of a good state of nature.
As a consequence, as shown in Proposition 1, when the investment required
to enter each site is small, then both ﬁrms enter all the 3 sites as soon as they
can; that is, they both choose the largest scale of entry. On the contrary, when I
is larger, ﬁrms prefer more cautious entry patterns in order to collect additional
information. Firm A enters just one site at t = 1; while ﬁrm B plays Wait and
See to infer information by observing the ﬁrst entrant’s behavior.
3.2 Firms are rivals
When ﬁrms are rivals, the pay-oﬀ that is obtained in a site depends not only on
the prevailing state of nature but also on the number of ﬁrms that are present.
This fact alters the behavior of the two ﬁrms with respect to the benchmark.
Let us denote (1 ¡ R), with 0 · R · 1, the per-period proﬁts in a site in
the case of the good state of nature and when both ﬁrms are present. Parameter
R represents a reduced form for the eﬀect of competition; the larger the R, the
stronger the competition.
In what follows, we characterize the equilibrium of the game for all the pa-







The ﬁrst inequality in 2 assures that, in expected terms, entry is proﬁtable
8even when duopoly proﬁts are to be earned.10 The second inequality implies that
the investment expenditure is large enough to induce ﬁrm B to play Wait and
See if ﬁrm A’s behavior at t = 2 is going to reveal the true state of nature.11
In order to characterize the equilibrium of the game we proceed backwards
by deﬁning as ﬁrst the equilibrium of the sub-games that ﬁrms play at t = 2.
We need to consider three diﬀerent sub-games depending on whether ﬁrm A has
entered one, two or the three sites during the ﬁrst period.
3.2.1 The equilibrium of the sub-games
As we verify in Lemmata 2, 3 and 5, the optimal behavior of ﬁrm A once it
has learned that the state of nature is either bad or medium coincides with the
one in the benchmark: it plays Exit in the former case and Stay in the latter.
Similarly, also a good type of ﬁrm A prefers playing Stay when mA = 3 was
chosen during the ﬁrst period. A deeper scrutiny has to be devoted to a good
type of ﬁrm A playing once mA 2 f1;2g was chosen. Entry in the remaining sites
is per se proﬁtable; that is, the proﬁts that are earned in these sites more than
compensate the investment expenditure required to enter them. However, ﬁrm A
recognizes that there is a signalling eﬀect too. By playing Enter it reveals that
the market is proﬁtable and thus it induces the competitor to enter the three
sites during the last period. As we show below, the optimal choice of a good
type of ﬁrm A depends on the number of sites it has already entered and on the
extent to which rivalry aﬀects its proﬁts.
Firm A entered one site during the ﬁrst period
Lemma 2 shows that when mA = 1 was chosen then the Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium (PBE) of the ensuing sub-game is separating.12 Firm A plays Exit,
10In particular, the ﬁrst inequality in 2 assures that when A has played mA = 3; then the
expected proﬁts of playing mB = 1 are non-negative for ﬁrm B.
11The case I <
(1¡R)
2 is of little interest. It can be easily veriﬁed that for this range of
parameters both ﬁrms enter the 3 sites as soon as they can.
12It would be possible to verify that requiring that the beliefs satisfy some “reasonable
restrictions”, then the one stated in Lemma 2 is the unique possible PBE of the sub-game.
The same holds true for the equilibria stated in Lemmata 3 and 5. However, the proofs to
verify the uniqueness of such equilibria are very cumbersome and do not add much to the
analysis we are presenting. Therefore, such proofs have been omitted even though they are
9Stay or Enter depending on whether it is of a bad, medium or good type respec-
tively. Given that the true state of nature is going to be revealed ﬁrm B plays
Wait and See and enters the three sites at t = 3 if Enter is observed.13
Lemma 2 The PBE of the sub-game played at t = 2 given mA = 1 is separating.
Firm A plays Exit if it is of a bad type, Stay if it is of a medium type and
Enter if it is of a good type. Firm B plays Wait and See and updates its
beliefs in the following way: ¹(Bad=Exit) = 1; ¹(Medium=Stay) = 1 and
¹(Good=(out;in)) = 1 for any (out;in) 6= Exit or Stay:
Having entered only one of the sites, a good type of ﬁrm A has strong incen-
tives to play Enter. Indeed, given the competitor’s beliefs, the only reasonable
alternative would be that of playing Stay to induce ﬁrm B into believing that
the state of nature is the medium one. However, this choice is not proﬁtable
enough. To fool the competitor a good type of ﬁrm A has to give up entry in two
proﬁtable sites. Moreover, the advantage of fooling the competitor, that is the
possibility of not facing its competition, can be enjoyed only in the site entered
at t = 1.
Firm A entered two sites during the ﬁrst period
The sub-game that ﬁrms play once mA = 2 was chosen is similar to the
one we have just discussed. However, this time for a good type of ﬁrm A the
advantages to deviate from a separating equilibrium are much larger. Indeed, by
playing Stay ﬁrm A induces the competitor not to enter the market and thus it
earns monopoly proﬁts in two sites rather than just in one. In addition to that,
by playing such a strategy it gives up entry in only one proﬁtable site and not
in two. In this case, whether or not ﬁrm A is willing to signal the good state of
nature by playing Enter depends on the extent to which competition aﬀects its
pay-oﬀ.
Lemma 3 When R · 2¡I
3 ´ RSep, the PBE of the sub-game played at t = 2
given mA = 2 is separating and coincides with the one characterized in Lemma
available from the author upon request.
13In the Lemmata 2 and 3 we denote ¹(j=(out;in)) the probability that ﬁrm B assigns to
the state of nature j once it has played Wait and See and ﬁrm A has played (out;in).
102. When R > RSep; then the PBE is semi-separating. Firm A plays Exit if it is
of a bad type, Stay if it is of a medium type and it chooses Enter with probability
x¤ and Stay with probability (1 ¡ x¤) if it is of a good type. Firm B plays mB = 1
with probability y¤ and Wait and See with probability (1 ¡ y¤). When it chooses
Wait and See, ﬁrm B updates its beliefs in the following way: ¹(Bad=Exit) = 1;
¹(Medium=Stay) = 1
2¡x¤; ¹(Good=Stay) = 1¡x¤
2¡x¤ and ¹(Good=(out;in)) = 1
for any (out;in) 6= Exit or Stay: Where x¤ = 4¡5I¡2R
3¡3I¡R and y¤ =
(I¡2)+3R
R .
When R is small, then the eﬀect of the induced competition is not too large and
therefore a good type enters the last site even though this fact signals to the
competitor the presence of a proﬁtable opportunity. The opposite holds when
R is large. In this case, the entry of the competitor aﬀects the ﬁrst entrant’s
pay-oﬀ to such an extent that the latter ﬁrm prefers to deviate from the sepa-
rating equilibrium and play Stay. This fact implies that separating is no longer
an equilibrium of the sub-game. As shown in Lemma 3, when R is large, the
equilibrium is semi-separating: a good type of ﬁrm A signals that the market is
proﬁtable by playing Enter with some probability and mimics the medium type
by playing Stay with complementary probability. Simultaneously, ﬁrm B ran-
domizes and plays mB = 1 and Wait and See with positive probability. In such
an equilibrium, a good type of ﬁrm A is willing to play Enter since with some
probability the competitor enters the market already at t = 2 and, therefore, it
is not possible to fool it by imitating the medium type. Moreover, a good type
of ﬁrm A is also willing to play Stay since in this way it deters the entry of the
competitor with positive probability. Indeed, consider what happens when no
ﬁrm enters nor exits any site at t = 2; that is, A plays Stay and B plays Wait
and See. In this case, ﬁrm B assigns a probability smaller than 1
2 to the good
state of nature since it knows that in equilibrium a medium type plays Stay with
probability 1 and the same choice is taken by a good type but with a strictly
smaller probability. We show in the Appendix that after observing Stay the
beliefs of ﬁrm B about the good state of nature have worsened to such an extent
that, in expected terms, entry is no longer proﬁtable.
The next technical result will be useful when commenting the optimal choice
of ﬁrm A at t = 1.
Lemma 4 The probability according to which ﬁrm B chooses Wait and See in
the semi-separating equilibrium of Lemma 3, (1 ¡ y¤), is a decreasing function
11of R:
As just said, a good type of ﬁrm A is willing to play Stay given that this choice
deters the competitor’s entry with a positive probability. Clearly, the stronger
the eﬀects of competition (the larger R) the greater the advantage of deterrence.
Therefore, to keep a good type A indiﬀerent between playing Enter or Stay a
decrease in the probability of deterrence have to be associated with an increase
in R:
Firm A entered three sites during the ﬁrst period
The behavior of ﬁrm A once it has entered the three sites during the ﬁrst
period coincides with the one in the benchmark. It plays Exit in the case of the
bad state and Stay in the case of either the medium or the good state. Such a
behavior reveals too few information to induce ﬁrm B to choose Wait and See.
Indeed, by observing that A plays Stay ﬁrm B is unable to infer whether the
state of nature is either medium or good. Therefore, as we verify in the following
Lemma 5, ﬁrm B prefers to enter the market already at t = 2.
Lemma 5 The equilibrium of the sub-game played at t = 2 given mA = 3, has
the following characteristics: ﬁrm A plays Exit if it is of a bad type and Stay if
it is of a medium or of a good type. Firm B plays mB = 1.
3.2.2 The optimal choice of ﬁrm A at t = 1
When choosing its initial scale of entry, ﬁrm A anticipates that on top of the
“basic trade-oﬀ” described in the benchmark there is also a strategic eﬀect to take
into account: its decision at t = 1 aﬀects the entry behavior of the competitor.
In the Appendix we show that the ﬁrst entrant prefers mA + 1 to mA provided
that the following condition holds:
µ1
3



















R ¸ 0; (3)
where y (i), with i = mA;mA + 1, indicates the probability of ﬁrm B playing
mB = 1 at t = 2 when ﬁrm A enters a number i of sites during the initial
period. The ﬁrst term of 3 coincides with expression 1 and represents the “basic
trade-oﬀ”. The second term is the strategic eﬀect.
12From the analysis of sub-section 3.2.1 we know that when ﬁrm A plays mA 2
f1;2g, then the competitor chooses Wait and See with probability 1 or with
probability (1¡y¤) depending on whether the separating or the semi-separating
equilibrium is going to be played. On the contrary, when ﬁrm A plays mA = 3,
ﬁrm B enters one site already at t = 2. Therefore, due to the reaction of ﬁrm B,
the ﬁrst entrant beneﬁts more from an initially small scale of entry: by playing
mA 2 f1;2g rather than mA = 3, ﬁrm A induces the competitor to play Wait
and See and thus to postpone entry with a larger probability. In other words,
small scale entry is strategically superior from the point of view of the ﬁrst
entrant. The intuition for this fact is that by entering with a small scale this
ﬁrm “commits” itself to revealing more precise information during the following
period thus increasing the beneﬁts of a waiting strategy for the competitor.
Proposition 6 here below characterizes the optimal choice of ﬁrm A at t = 1;
Figure 1 represents this choice graphically.14
Proposition 6 The optimal choice of ﬁrm A at t = 1 is characterized as follows:
i) when R · RSep :
- for I > 1
2: it plays mA = 1;
- for I · 1
2: it plays mA = 2.
ii) when R > RSep :
- for I > e I ´ 2R ¡ 1: it plays mA = 2;
- for I · e I: it plays mA = 3.
When the eﬀect of competition is not too strong (case i)), mA = 1 and
mA = 2 are strategically equivalent: after both choices the separating equilibrium
is played and then in both cases the competitor chooses Wait and See with
probability 1. As a consequence, the basic trade-oﬀ drives ﬁrm A’s decision:
when the required investment is large it chooses mA = 1 (Region 1 in Figure 1),
while when I is smaller it chooses mA = 2 (Region 2). As shown in Figure 1,
case ii) of Proposition 6 occurs for small values of the investment expenditure.
Due to the “basic trade-oﬀ”, in this range of parameters mA = 1 is dominated
and ﬁrm A plays mA = 3 when I is very low (Region 4) and mA = 2 when the
investment expenditure is larger (Region 3).






























Figure 1: The optimal choice of ﬁrm A at t = 1
The impact of a stronger eﬀect of competition
The larger the extent to which rivalry aﬀects the pay-oﬀ of the ﬁrst entrant
the more this ﬁrm beneﬁts from inducing the competitor to postpone entry into
the market. In other terms, the larger the R the more important the strategic
considerations. To appreciate fully how the choice of the ﬁrst entrant varies with
R we need to consider what happens for values of I smaller than 1¡R
2 . For sake
of brevity this case has been omitted in this version of this paper. However,
it can be easily veriﬁed that for such low levels of the investment expenditure
the two ﬁrms enter the three sites as soon they are allowed to play: ﬁrm A at
t = 1 and ﬁrm B at t = 2. Therefore, considering a ﬁxed value of the investment
expenditure such as I0 in Figure 1 one can see that: when R is low (region below
the 1¡R
2 line) it is optimal for ﬁrm A to enter three sites at t = 1; as R gets
larger (Region 2) mA = 2 is optimal. The intuition for this result is trivial. As
14said above, the larger the eﬀect of competition the more the ﬁrst entrant beneﬁts
from entering with a small scale in order to delay the competitor’s entry.
When R is larger than RSep there is another eﬀect to consider. As we know
from Lemma 4, the probability of ﬁrm B playing Wait and See in the semi-
separating equilibrium decreases with R. Obviously, this fact has a detrimental
eﬀect on the pay-oﬀ that ﬁrm A gets when playing mA = 2. Consider a value
of the investment expenditure such as I00 in Figure 1. For values of R slightly
greater than RSep ﬁrm A plays mA = 2 (Region 3). However, as R enlarges the
ﬁrst entrant chooses mA = 3 (Region 4). Indeed, even though it becomes more
beneﬁcial to induce the competitor to play Wait and See, as R gets larger the
probability of ﬁrm B playing such a strategy shrinks thus making mA = 3 the
best option.
4 Discussion
In this section of the paper we discuss what happens if some of the assumptions
of Section 3 are relaxed.
4.1 Non-negligible pay-oﬀs in the case of the bad and
medium states of nature
Assuming that the pay-oﬀ that ﬁrms obtain in the case of the bad and medium
states of nature is non-negligible does not qualitatively alter the conclusions we
have drawn in the “Simpliﬁed Setting”.15
The equilibrium of the sub-games
The analysis performed in Subsection 3.2.1 largely applies to this more general
framework. This fact implies that the main conclusion we have drawn is still
valid: the smaller the initial scale of entry and the lower the eﬀect of competition,
the larger the incentives for the ﬁrst entrant to reveal that the state of nature is
good by playing Enter. Indeed, under the assumptions of Section 2, a bad and a
medium type still ﬁnd it optimal to play Exit and Stay, respectively. Therefore,
15A more formal analysis of the discussion in this sub-section is available on request
15a good type of ﬁrm A faces exactly the same trade-oﬀ as in the previous analysis
and thus: it plays Enter if mA = 1 was chosen or in the case of mA = 2 if
R · RSep. When R > RSep and if mA = 2 was chosen, then the equilibrium of
the sub-game is semi-separating and a good type of ﬁrm A randomizes attaching
positive probability to both Enter and Stay. The only possible novel aspect
with respect to the previous analysis occurs when ﬁrm A plays mA = 3: it might
happen that ﬁrm B ﬁnds it optimal to play Wait and See in this case too.
Indeed, the behavior of the ﬁrst entrant at t = 2 reveals whether the state of
nature is bad or not: ﬁrm A plays Exit if it is of a bad type and Stay otherwise.
Therefore, provided that the losses in the bad state are large enough, it might
be optimal for ﬁrm B to play Wait and See even when ﬁrm A chose mA = 3.
The optimal choice of ﬁrm A at t = 1
Having non-negligible per-period proﬁts in the case of the bad and medium
states of nature has obvious consequences on the basic trade-oﬀ described in the
benchmark. The larger the proﬁts in the medium state the more ﬁrms prefer to
enter with a large initial scale. Contrarily, the larger the losses in the bad state,
the better small scales of entry perform. In terms of the strategic eﬀect, it is still
true that by entering with a small scale ﬁrm A increases the probability of the
competitor playing Wait and See and, in particular, choosing mA = 1 always
induces the competitor to postpone entry with probability 1. As noted above,
under some circumstances mA = 3 also induces the competitor to play Wait and
See. However, this fact occurs provided that the losses in the bad state are large
enough and, therefore, in these circumstances mA = 3 is too risky for ﬁrm A and
tends to be preferred by smaller scales of entry.
4.2 Non-uniformly distributed priors
Assuming that the three states of nature are not equally likely leads to conse-
quences that are similar to those we have just discussed for the case on non-
negligible pay-oﬀs in the bad and medium states of nature. Under the as-
sumptions of Section 2, the equilibrium of the sub-game that ﬁrms play once
mA 2 f1;2g is chosen is unchanged for the same reasons as those we pointed
16out in Sub-section 4.1.16 Similarly, ﬁrm B might choose Wait and See even
when ﬁrm A plays mA = 3. Indeed, provided that the prior probabilities of the
medium and the good states are diﬀerent, the choice Stay is more informative:
the probability that the state is good (or medium) once Stay has been observed
is diﬀerent from 1
2.
Turning to the optimal initial scale of entry, remarks similar to those we have
made above apply. Firms are more prone to enter with a larger scale the higher
the probability of the good state and the smaller the probability of the bad
state.17 Moreover, in all the cases in which mA = 3 induces the competitor to
choose Wait and See, then playing mA 2 f1;2g is not strategically superior
from the point of view of the ﬁrst entrant. However, the information that the
competitor obtains by playing Wait and See once ﬁrm A has chosen mA 2 f1;2g
is always superior. The two coincide if and only if the probability of the medium
state of nature is 0. Therefore, even if it is reduced, the strategic advantage of
entering with a small scale vanishes for all the relevant range of parameters only
when there are just two states of nature: the bad and the good.
4.3 Symmetric ﬁrms
Consider what happens to the game we have analyzed in the case of the two ﬁrms
being symmetric, that is, they can both play starting from period t = 1 and,
therefore, there is no exogenous ﬁrst and second entrant. To keep the analysis
strategically equivalent to that of the previous sections, consider that the two
ﬁrms are allowed to choose their entry strategies in two subsequent periods at
most. In this case, it can be easily veriﬁed that under the assumptions of the
“Simpliﬁed Setting” both ﬁrms enter the market with some scale from the ﬁrst
period and neither of them would play Wait and See. Indeed, in this symmetric
setting in order to receive information about the market conditions a ﬁrm has
to wait during two periods rather then just one. However, one needs to stress
16Clearly what changes are the probabilities according to which ﬁrms randomize in the semi-
separating equilibrium
17Obviously, the eﬀect of changes in the probability of the medium state is ambiguous. If it
enlarges to the detriment of the probability of the bad state it makes large scale entry more
beneﬁcial, while if it reduces the probability of the good state it makes small scale entry more
likely to be preferred
17that this result depends on the assumptions we have imposed in Section 3. In
particular, the ex-ante expected proﬁtability is too large to induce one ﬁrm to
wait for two periods. Contrarily, if the ex-ante expected proﬁtability is not so
large then things change drastically. In a previous version of this paper we have
dealt with such an issue.18 We have considered the presence of just two states of
nature, the medium and the good and, the respective prior probabilities being
0 < p < 1 and 0 < 1 ¡ p < 1, we have shown that, provided that the eﬀect of
competition is not too strong, then the set of parameters for which an endogenous
ﬁrst-second entrant structure arises in equilibrium is larger in the case of rivalry
than in the benchmark. That is, we are more likely to have an equilibrium in
which one ﬁrm enters at t = 1, while the other plays Wait and See for two periods
when ﬁrms are competing rather than when there are no pay-oﬀ externalities.
The intuition for this result is twofold. On the one hand, the opportunity cost of
playing Wait and See is lower when there is rivalry. Indeed, in this case when
waiting a ﬁrm is giving up potential duopoly rather than monopoly proﬁts. On
the other hand, the second and more interesting reason for the result is derived
from the analysis we have performed in this paper. Due to strategic reasons
the (endogenous) ﬁrst entrant is more willing to enter with a small scale and
“commit” itself to revealing the good state of the market later on. In turn, this
fact makes it more beneﬁcial for a (endogenous) second entrant to choose Wait
and See.
4.4 Pay-oﬀ Complementarities
In a previous version of this paper,19 we showed that in case of pay-oﬀ com-
plementarities (R is negative) strategic considerations make mA = 3 a more
beneﬁcial choice for the ﬁrst entrant.20 The intuition for this fact is opposite to
the one we have in case of rival ﬁrms. Indeed, by “committing” itself to reveal
less precise information the ﬁrst entrant induces the other ﬁrm to enter already
at t = 2 so that the pay-oﬀ complementarities are enjoyed starting from the sec-
ond period. This result reminds us of the one obtained in Alexander-Cook et al.
18See Comino (2000).
19See Comino (2000).
20Clearly, when R < 0, a good type of ﬁrm A is always willing to play Enter and then the
equilibrium of the sub-game played at t = 2 once mA 2 f1;2g was chosen is always separating.
18(1998), where the authors show that a ﬁrm prefers not to acquire information to
“commit” in order not to incur in the cost of revealing it. However, the intuition
of their result is rather diﬀerent. By not acquiring information a ﬁrm induces
others to acquire it and to incur the costs of revealing it. Thus, in their case it
is a free-rider argument that explains the strategic behavior of ﬁrms.
5 Conclusions
A signiﬁcant empirical literature has pointed out that when deciding about en-
try in a market of unknown proﬁtability, ﬁrms often take a wait and see atti-
tude in order to learn information from the behavior of competitors. In other
words, information externalities are a relevant channel through which ﬁrms try
to learn the proﬁtability conditions of the market they are targeting. In this
paper we have proposed a ﬁrst attempt to analyze the issue of entry in a context
in which information externalities might arise. In particular, we have aimed at
studying how the possibility of revealing information to a competitor alters the
entry/investment behavior of a ﬁrst entrant. We have shown that the choices of
this ﬁrm, both after as well as before having entered the market, are altered. The
decision of increasing its investment level once it is already located in the market
is a clear signal that the market condition are favorable. Therefore, in order
to hide this information to the competitor, the ﬁrst entrant might refrain from
making further proﬁtable investments. We have pointed out that the incentives
behave in this manner are higher the stronger the eﬀect of competition is and
the larger the investment the ﬁrst entrant has already in place. In turn, this last
observation gives the intuition of why the presence of possible information exter-
nalities makes it strategically superior for the ﬁrst entrant to choose an initially
small scale of entry. In this way, the ﬁrm “commits” itself to revealing the true
proﬁtability conditions once it has entered the market. The ﬁrst entrant beneﬁts
from this fact because by “committing” to reveal more precise information it
induces the the competitor to play a wait and see strategy, that is, to postpone
entry in order to learn more about the market proﬁtability.
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Proof of Proposition 1





3 ¡ (3 ¡ mA)I
´
+ 1
3(3) and, therefore, it prefers mA + 1 to mA provided that
1
3(1)¡I + 1
3(I) ¸ 0. This fact implies that the optimal choice of the ﬁrst entrant
is mA = 3 if I · 1
2 and mA = 1 otherwise.21 Similarly, when playing mB ¸ 1
at t = 2 ﬁrm B expects 1
3mB(1) ¡ mB(I) + 1
3
³
3 ¡ (3 ¡ mB)I
´
. The pay-oﬀ ﬁrm
B obtains by playing mB = 0 depends on the choice of ﬁrm A at t = 1. When
I > 1
2, ﬁrm A plays mA = 1 and it reveals the state of nature during the following
period. In this case, when choosing mB = 0 ﬁrm B expects 1
3 (3(1 ¡ I)) since it
anticipates that it will enter three sites at t = 3 if Enter is observed and none
otherwise. Condition I > 1
2 guarantees that mB = 0 is preferred to any mB ¸ 1.
When I · 1
2, ﬁrm A plays mA = 3 and during the following period it plays Exit
in case of the bad state and Stay in case of either the medium or the good. In
this case, when playing mB = 0 ﬁrm B anticipates that if Exit is observed then
it will not enter any site, while it will enter the three sites at t = 3 in case of
observing Stay. Therefore, evaluated at t = 2 the choice of playing mB = 0




2 (3) ¡ 3I
´
. Condition I · 1
2 implies that it is
optimal to play mB = 3.
Proof of Lemma 2
In equilibrium, by playing any mB ﬁrm B expects 1










. Condition 2 implies that mB is preferred to mB +1
and, therefore, that mB = 0 is ﬁrm B’s best response. For the bad and the
medium types of ﬁrm A it is straightforward to check that Exit and Stay are
respectively optimal. A good type of ﬁrm A obtains a continuation pay-oﬀ of
3 ¡ 2I + 3(1 ¡ R) by playing according to the equilibrium. Given the beliefs of
ﬁrm B, the only reasonable deviation from the equilibrium strategy for a good
type is to play Stay. The continuation pay-oﬀ it obtains in this case is 2 which
is certainly less than what it earns in equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 3
When R · RSep the equilibrium is separating. By playing any mB ﬁrm B
obtains an expected pay-oﬀ of 1
3mB (1 ¡ R)¡mBI + 1
3
³






21It would be easy to verify that mA = 0 is a dominated strategy.
20and condition 2 implies that mB = 0 is its best response. For the bad and the
medium types of ﬁrm A it is straightforward to check that Exit and Stay are
respectively optimal. In equilibrium, a good type of ﬁrm A obtains a continuation
pay-oﬀ of 3¡I+3(1¡R). Given the beliefs of the competitor, the only reasonable
deviation from the equilibrium strategy for a good type is to play Stay which
yields a continuation pay-oﬀ of 4. Condition R · RSep implies that a good type
of ﬁrm A prefers to play Enter rather than Stay.
In the semi-separating equilibrium a good type of ﬁrm A plays Enter with




3(1 ¡ R) ¡ I + 1





3(1) ¡ I + 1
3 (2(1 ¡ R) + 1 ¡ 2I)
´




3(3(1 ¡ R) ¡ 3(I))
´
, that is, ﬁrm B anticipates that it will enter the 3 sites at
t = 3 provided that Enter is observed and none otherwise. Choosing not to enter
the market after observing Exit is optimal since ﬁrm B infers that the bad state
has occurred with probability 1, while we show shortly below that the same choice
is optimal even after observing that ﬁrm A plays Stay: Firm B is indiﬀerent at
t = 2 between mB = 1 and mB = 0 provided that a good type of ﬁrm A plays
Enter with probability x¤ = 4¡5I¡2R
3¡3I¡R and Stay with complementary probability:
Condition 2 assures that x¤ 2 (0;1): To complete the characterization of ﬁrm B’s
behavior we need to check that it is optimal not to enter any site at t = 3 if at
t = 2 it has played mB = 0 and ﬁrm A has played Stay. According to the Bayes
rule ¹(Medium=Stay) = 1
2¡x¤ and ¹(Good=Stay) = 1¡x¤
2¡x¤. Entry in any site
is not proﬁtable provided that 1¡x¤
2¡x¤(1) < I; that is, provided that 1¡R¡I2
3¡R¡3I > 0.
This last inequality holds true under condition 2. Consider now ﬁrm A. It is
straightforward to verify that for the bad and the medium types Exit and Stay
are respectively optimal. Given the beliefs of the competitor, for a good type of
ﬁrm A Enter dominates any other choice diﬀerent from Stay: By playing Enter
it expects y (2 + (1 ¡ R) ¡ I + 3(1 ¡ R)) + (1 ¡ y)(3 ¡ I + 3(1 ¡ R)), while by
playing Stay it expects y (2 + 2(1 ¡ R)) + (1 ¡ y)4: The good type of ﬁrm A is
indiﬀerent between these two choices provided that B plays mB = 1 with proba-
bility y¤ =
(I¡2)+3R
R and mB = 0 with complementary probability. Conditions 2
and R > RSep guarantee that y¤ 2 (0;1).
22It can be easily veriﬁed that condition 2 implies that mB = 1 is preferred to both mB = 2
and mB = 3.
21Proof of Lemma 4




Proof of Lemma 5
Given the equilibrium strategy of the ﬁrst entrant, when playing mB = 0 ﬁrm B
expects a pay-oﬀ of 0 since it anticipates that it will not enter any site at t = 3.
Indeed, if Exit is observed, then ﬁrm B infers that the bad state has certainly
occurred. When Stay is observed, then ﬁrm B will assign probability 1
2 to the
medium and good states and, conditional on these probabilities, entry in a site
at t = 3 is not proﬁtable since condition 2 implies that 1
2(1 ¡ R) ¡ I < 0.23 By





3(1 ¡ R) ¡ (3 ¡ mB)I
´
. Condition 2 guarantees that mB = 1 is preferred to
both mB = 0 and mB 2 f2;3g. It is straightforward to verify that the optimal
choice for a bad type of ﬁrm A is to play Exit, while Stay is optimal for both a
medium and a good type.
Proof of Proposition 6
To ease the presentation we make use of the following notation. Condition (2)
is substituted by I ¸ I ¸ I, where I ´ 4
5(1 ¡ R) and I ´ 1¡R
2 . Conditions
R · RSep and R > RSep are substituted by I · ISep and I > ISep respectively,
where ISep ´ 2 ¡ 3R:
We start the proof by verifying that the sets of parameters deﬁning cases
i) and ii) are non-empty. Note that I · ISep provided that R · 3
5, ISep · I
provided that R ¸ 6
11, while I · I holds for any R ¸ 0: Therefore, case i) exists
provided that R · 3
5 and it is deﬁned for I · I · I when R < 6
11 and for
I · I · ISep when 6
11 · R · 3
5. Case ii) exists provided that R ¸ 6
11 and it is
deﬁned for ISep < I · I for 6
11 · R · 3
5 and for I · I · I for R > 3
5:
² case i): I · ISep :
By playing mA = 3 ﬁrm A obtains an expected pay-oﬀ of 1
3(3) ¡ 3(I) +
1
3 (2 + (1 ¡ R))+ 1





3 ¡ (3 ¡ mA)I
´
+ 1
3 (3(1 ¡ R)). The choice mA = 2 is preferred to
23Note that if the second inequality of condition 2 is not veriﬁed, that is if I · 1¡R
2 holds
true, then by playing mB = 0 ﬁrm B obtains a strictly positive pay-oﬀ. Indeed, upon observing
Stay it would be optimal for this ﬁrm to enter the three sites at t = 3. However, also in this
case it mB = 1 is preferred to mB = 0 and therefore it does happen that ﬁrm B plays Wait
and See once A has chosen mA = 3.
22mA = 3 if and only if 1
3 (1) ¡ I + 1
3I ¡ 1
3R · 0 which holds true since I ¸ I.
Moreover, mA = 2 is preferred to mA = 1 provided that 1
3 (1)¡I + 1
3I ¸ 0, that
is, provided that I · 1
2.
One can check that the following conditions hold: 1
2 · ISep when R · 1
2 and
1
2 · I when R · 3
8. Therefore, the optimal choice of ﬁrm A is:
- when R < 3
8: mA = 2 for I · I · 1
2 and mA = 1 for 1
2 < I · I;
- when 3
8 · R < 6
11: mA = 2 for I · I · I
- when 6
11 · R · 3
5 : mA = 2 for I · I · ISep.
² case ii): I > ISep :
The pay-oﬀs ﬁrm A obtains when playing either mA = 3 or mA = 1 coincide
with those in case i). By playing mA = 2 it obtains 1
3(2)¡2(I)+1
3 (3 ¡ y¤R ¡ I)+
1
3(3(1¡R)), where y¤ is deﬁned in Lemma 3. Firm A prefers mA = 2 to mA = 1
provided that 1¡R¡I ¸ 0, which holds true since I · I. Moreover, mA = 3 is
preferred to mA = 2 provided that 1
3(1) ¡ I + 1
3(I) + 1
3 ((y¤ ¡ 1)R) ¸ 0, that is
provided that I · e I; where e I ´ 2R ¡ 1:
One can check that e I · I when R · 9
14, while conditions e I · ISep and e I · I
hold when R · 3
5: Therefore, the optimal choice of ﬁrm A is:
- when 6
11 · R · 3
5: m = 2 for ISep < I · I;
- when 3
5 < R · 9
14: mA = 3 for I · I · e I and mA = 2 for e I < I · I;
- when R > 9
14 : mA = 3 for I · I · I.
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